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Disease control programs aim to constrain and reduce the 
spread of infection. Human disease interventions such as 
wildlife vaccination play a major role in determining the lim-
its of a pathogen’s spatial distribution. Over the past few 
decades, a raccoon-specific variant of rabies virus (RRV) 
has invaded large areas of eastern North America. Although 
expansion into Canada has been largely prevented through 
vaccination along the US border, several outbreaks have 
occurred in Canada. Applying phylogeographic approaches 
to 289 RRV whole-genome sequences derived from isolates 
collected in Canada and adjacent US states, we examined 
the processes underlying these outbreaks. RRV incursions 
were attributable predominantly to systematic virus leakage 
of local strains across areas along the border where vac-
cination has been conducted but also to single stochastic 
events such as long-distance translocations. These results 
demonstrate the utility of phylogeographic analysis of patho-
gen genomes for understanding transboundary outbreaks.
Control measures are often used at the edges of a patho-gen’s range to limit geographic spread and prevent in-
cursions of infection into areas free from disease. Although 
geopolitical boundaries generally do not directly affect 
spread of infectious diseases, human-imposed control mea-
sures are often structured around national or international 
borders. Where such control measures fail, the resulting out-
breaks can prove extremely costly in terms of public health 
and economic and political consequences. It is therefore 
vital to understand the events involved in such transbound-
ary outbreaks of infection and particularly how these events 
relate to the control measures applied at the boundary.
Rabies virus is a major zoonotic pathogen worldwide. 
In the United States, the geographic range of the raccoon 
variant of rabies virus (RRV) has expanded in recent de-
cades and is now endemic throughout the eastern seaboard 
area (1). Further spread of RRV has been largely contained 
through oral vaccination of raccoons along the edge of its 
range (2). However, multiple incursions across the vacci-
nation corridor have occurred at the northern edge of the 
RRV range, corresponding to the US–Canada border; the 
resulting outbreaks in the Canadian provinces of Ontario, 
Quebec, and New Brunswick have necessitated large-scale 
control operations to prevent the establishment of RRV 
in Canada. By focusing specifically on these outbreaks of 
RRV in Canada, we are by default highlighting points at 
which transboundary controls have failed. However, our 
doing so does not imply that the control measures at the 
Canada border have been unsuccessful. Despite the epi-
demic expansion of RRV covering 40–60 km/year in the 
absence of controls (3–6), spatial spread of RRV has been 
static in most areas of the Canada border for >15 years (7).
RRV was first reported in the US state of New York 
in 1990. By 1994, it had spread to reach the Canada bor-
der at Niagara in western New York, and by 1996, it had 
reached the New York–Ontario border at the St. Lawrence 
River. Implementation of rabies vaccination started along 
the Niagara River in 1994 and at potential crossing points 
along the St. Lawrence River from 1995 on, later replaced 
by larger scale oral vaccination (8). The first RRV outbreak 
in Ontario occurred in the southeastern part of the prov-
ince during 1999–2005; 126 cases were confined to an area 
of the mainland adjacent to the St. Lawrence River, and 6 
cases occurred on Wolfe Island between Ontario and New 
York at the mouth of Lake Ontario (8,9). More recently, in 
2015, an outbreak was identified west of the Niagara area 
and is ongoing (7).
At the US–Canada border between Quebec and Ver-
mont, oral rabies vaccination was implemented in the late 
1990s in response to the northward spread of RRV through 
Vermont. The first outbreak of RRV in Quebec occurred 
during 2006–2009, near the Vermont border (10). Another 
isolated case of raccoon rabies was reported in 2015 at the 
border with New York in southwestern Quebec (7).
In New Brunswick, RRV outbreaks occurred during 
2000–2002 and 2014–2016, both in the southwestern part 
Processes Underlying Rabies Virus 
Incursions across US–Canada  
Border as Revealed by  
Whole-Genome Phylogeography 
Hannah Trewby, Susan A. Nadin-Davis, Leslie A. Real, Roman Biek
1454 Emerging Infectious Diseases • www.cdc.gov/eid • Vol. 23, No. 9, September 2017
RESEARCH
Author affiliations: Emory University, Atlanta, Georgia, USA  
(H. Trewby, L.A. Real); University of Glasgow, Glasgow, Scotland, 
UK (H. Trewby, R. Biek); Canadian Food Inspection Agency,  
Ottawa, Ontario, Canada (S.A. Nadin-Davis)
DOI: https://doi.org/10.3201/eid2309.170325
Rabies Virus Incursions across US–Canada Border
of the province near the border with Maine (7). RRV vacci-
nation was conducted at the New Brunswick–Maine border 
from 2001 through 2008 and is currently in place after the 
2015 outbreak.
In this study, we used RRV whole-genome sequences 
to investigate the processes giving rise to these outbreaks 
in Canada, particularly with respect to the effectiveness of 
the vaccine area at the US–Canada border, and to deter-
mine whether these processes were comparable across dif-
ferent outbreaks. We generated 289 RRV whole-genome 
sequences: 140 sequences from RRV cases covering each 
of the Canada outbreaks and 149 sequences from cases 
in the neighboring US states of New York, Vermont, and 
Maine. Using Bayesian phylogeographic approaches, we 
addressed the following 3 questions: 1) Did the Canada 
outbreaks result from multiple simultaneous incursions of 
RRV or from single introductions? 2) Is there evidence of 
backflow of RRV from Canada into the United States? 3) 
Did the Canada outbreaks originate from RRV lineages 




In eastern Canada, brain samples from animals suspected 
to be infected with rabies virus are submitted to the Centre 
of Expertise for Rabies of the Canadian Food Inspection 
Agency in Ottawa for diagnosis. In addition, any rabies-
positive wildlife cases diagnosed by provincial authorities 
during enhanced surveillance activities are confirmed by 
the laboratory in Ottawa. We selected a temporally and spa-
tially representative subset of RRV samples for sequencing 
from the Canada outbreaks in Ontario (n = 57), Quebec (n 
= 51), and New Brunswick (n = 32). For comparison, we 
obtained another set of confirmed rabies virus samples, in 
most cases collected over the same period as the Canada 
outbreaks, for sequencing from the relevant state rabies 
laboratories of New York, Vermont, and Maine. The high-
density sampling in New York and Vermont enabled us to 
focus sampling on cases within 75 km of the Canada border 
in these 2 states (54 sequenced samples in New York and 
62 in Vermont), with the aim of capturing representatives 
of most RRV lineages circulating near the border. A lower 
density of samples was available from Maine, collected 
in 2013 and 2014 only, and therefore we sequenced RRV 
from throughout this state (33 sequences). Details of se-
quenced samples are shown in online Technical Appendix 
Table 1 (https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/EID/article/23/9/17-0325-
Techapp1.pdf).
We performed RRV genome extraction and sequenc-
ing as described in detail by Nadin-Davis et al. (11). Vi-
ral RNA was extracted from brain tissue of animals with 
confirmed infection by using Trizol (Life Technologies 
Inc., Carlsbad, CA, USA) and further purified by using 
a MagMax instrument (Applied Biosystems, Foster City, 
CA, USA). RNA was amplified as 3 overlapping ampli-
cons covering the whole RRV genome. Purified ampli-
cons from a single sample were pooled and used to gen-
erate indexed libraries with Nextera XT kits (Illumina, 
Inc., San Diego, CA, USA); libraries were sequenced as 
200- or 250-bp paired end reads on an Illumina MiSeq 
machine. Genomes were sequenced with high depth of 
coverage (average >1,000×), and reference-based assem-
bly was conducted by use of the NGen program in the 
DNASTAR Lasergene software package, version 11 (12), 
with either the RRV reference genome (GenBank acces-
sion no. EU311738) or more genetically related sequences 
generated during this study that better facilitated complete 
assembly, to generate consensus sequences.
Phylogeographic Analyses
To estimate RRV transitions between geographic regions, 
we conducted discrete trait phylogeographic analysis (13). 
Sequences were grouped into 8 groups according to loca-
tion: western Ontario, eastern Ontario, western New York, 
northwestern New York, New Brunswick, Maine, Quebec, 
and Vermont (this latter group includes 2 New York se-
quences, New York.1995.3745 and New York.2011.5590 
[online Technical Appendix Table 1], which clustered 
geographically and genetically with Vermont sequences). 
Independent incursions into Canada were identified as lin-
eages of the maximum clade credibility phylogeny stem-
ming from a most recent common ancestor with a >90% 
posterior probability of occurring in Ontario, Quebec, or 
New Brunswick, according to discrete trait ancestral state 
reconstruction.
We conducted analyses in BEAST version 1.8.2 (14) 
with the BEAGLE library (15) by using the generalized 
time-reversible model with gamma distributed rate varia-
tion among sites and separate partitions for coding and 
noncoding regions and a relaxed molecular clock (12) 
with branch rates drawn from an exponential distribution 
(identified by model selection as the best fitting models for 
these data; online Technical Appendix text and Table 2). 
Asymmetric transition rates were allowed between regions. 
Significant transitions were identified by using Bayesian 
stochastic search variable selection to calculate Bayes fac-
tors in the program SPREAD version 1.0.6 (16), and the 
number of transitions between regions was estimated by 
using Markov Jump counts (17).
Identifying Long-Distance Movement
If an outbreak in Canada were the result of local spread of 
infection, we would expect the responsible viruses to be 
genetically similar to US RRV lineages circulating near the 
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Canada border. However, even where dense sampling and 
sequencing was conducted near the Canada border (i.e., in 
New York and Vermont), sampling was not exhaustive. 
Therefore, the absence of a virus closely related to that 
causing the Canada outbreak in neighboring US regions 
may indicate an outbreak initiated by long-distance virus 
movement but could also be the result of incomplete sam-
pling of RRV transmission chains circulating in the local 
area. We extracted the coalescent time between the most 
recent common ancestor of a Canada outbreak and the 
most genetically similar US sequence as a measure of the 
length of time the outbreak lineage had been circulating 
unsampled. To generate an expectation for the length of 
time lineages would circulate undetected under our sam-
pling regimen, we took the distribution of coalescent times 
for US sequences within each of the 3 major clades. Co-
alescent times falling outside the 95th percentile interval of 
US times indicate an outbreak that was probably initiated 
by long-distance movement. Depending on the (unknown) 
level of long-distance movement underlying the US sam-
ples, this 95th percentile might be overly conservative in 
identifying long-distance movements.
Results
The sequenced samples fell into 3 well-supported major 
clades (Figure 1) that are largely structured by region. 
Clade I consists predominantly of sequences from Quebec 
and Vermont, although it also includes 5 sequences from 
northwestern New York and from the 1 case in western 
Ontario (Ontario-15); clade II is restricted to samples from 
New Brunswick and Maine; and clade III contains samples 
from Ontario and New York, with the addition of the 1 iso-
late from western Quebec in 2015 (Quebec-15). Clades I 
and III correspond to lineages identified in a previous study 
of RRV in New York (18); clade I corresponds to lineage 
3A (found in southeastern New York in the previous study) 
and clade III to 3B (found in western and northern New 
York). Because our sampling scheme focuses on RRV 
infections near the Canada border in western and north-
ern New York, only 5 of the samples from New York se-
quenced here fall into clade I.
BEAST analysis revealed a molecular clock rate of 
3.28 × 10-4 nucleotide substitutions/site across the ge-
nome for these sequences (95% highest posterior density 
[HPD] 2.83 × 10-4 to 3.76 × 10-4). The time to most recent 
common ancestor was estimated as 1990 for clade I (95% 
HPD 1983–1994), 1994 for clade II (95% HPD 1988–
1998), and 1987 for clade III (95% HPD 1979–1991). 
These estimates suggest that the 3 clades were probably 
already diverged before RRV entered the region, as indi-
cated by Szanto et al. (18).
We identified 10 independent incursions of RRV, 
giving rise to the 6 Canada outbreaks, from the maximum 
clade credibility tree (Figure 1). We analyzed each of 
these outbreaks to determine the number of recorded cas-
es and whether evidence exists for multiple virus intro-
ductions, backflow to the United States, or long-distance 
movement (Table).
Ontario
Ontario was subject to a persistent outbreak of RRV from 
1999 through 2005, resulting in reported cases on Wolfe 
Island and the Leeds/Grenville area in mainland Ontario. 
Discrete traits reconstruction (Figure 1, eastern Ontario 
outbreak shown in dark blue) suggested that the Wolfe Is-
land viruses (Ontario-99b) are part of a separate incursion 
to the mainland (Ontario-99a), confirming previous sug-
gestions from partial genome data (19). Our results give no 
indication that the mainland Ontario incursion was caused 
by multiple invading lineages, and we found no evidence 
for backflow of infection from Ontario to the United States 
(online Technical Appendix Figure 1). Sequences from the 
eastern Ontario outbreak were genetically closely related to 
sequences circulating locally on the US side of the border 
with eastern Ontario (Figure 2), suggesting that local spread 
of infection is responsible for initiating this outbreak. The 
spatial-genetic spread of this Ontario outbreak is described 
in more detail by Nadin-Davis et al. (11).
By contrast, the outbreak in western Ontario (repre-
sented here by 1 sequence, Ontario-15) falls into a com-
pletely separate clade (clade I) than other viruses circulat-
ing in the neighboring area of New York (clade III; light 
orange branches in Figure 1). Even in comparison with oth-
er sequences in clade I, the Ontario-15 sequence is consid-
erably divergent; coalescent time is >20 years, and it falls 
distinctly outside the 95th percentile of coalescent times 
for US sequences in this clade (Figure 2). These findings 
provide evidence that the variant represented by isolate 
Ontario-15 was the result of long-distance movement from 
outside the study area, rather than local spread across the 
border. Although our results provide some statistical sup-
port for the Ontario-15 incursion originating in Vermont 
(online Technical Appendix Figure 1), a more full explora-
tion of the origins of the Ontario-15 incursion would re-
quire a more comprehensive study in which sampling is 
not restricted to RRV samples within 75 km of the Canada 
border. An additional isolate from this ongoing outbreak, 
sequenced subsequent to preparation of this article, differs 
from the Ontario-15 isolate at 13 of 11,924 sites. This find-
ing represents a genetic similarity of 99.9%, which would 
place these 2 samples in the same phylogenetic group (data 
not shown).
Quebec
With the exception of the 1 case in eastern Quebec in 2015 
(Quebec-15), all cases of RRV infection from Quebec were 
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reported from 2006 through 2009 and were again focused 
on a relatively small area (Figure 3). The combination of 
the high level of discrimination provided by whole-genome 
sequencing plus high-density sequencing of samples from 
close to the Canada border in this study have made it pos-
sible to attribute this single temporal outbreak to several 
separate incursions of RRV into Quebec (lineages Que-
bec-06, Quebec-07a, Quebec-07b, and Quebec-07c; Figure 
1). The last 2 reported cases of RRV in this outbreak, al-
though located near the border, are shown here to be part of 
an ongoing circulation of lineage Quebec-07b within Que-
bec, rather than a separate introduction, as might have been 
assumed in the absence of sequencing.
Incursions of lineages Quebec-07a, Quebec-07b, and 
Quebec-07c involved viruses closely genetically related to 
others circulating locally near the Quebec border (Figure 
2), indicating that these were probably the result of local 
spread from RRV circulating near the border. Although the 
Quebec-06 lineage seems more genetically distinct from 
other sequences circulating near the border (and also from 
the other Quebec lineages; Figure 1), it does fall within the 
95th percentile interval for coalescent times in this clade 
(Figure 2, panel A); therefore, there is no evidence to rule 
out the possibility that local spread from Vermont initi-
ated this incursion. Phylogenetic analysis using discrete 
traits provides strong statistical support (online Technical 
Appendix Figure 1) for backflow of RRV infection from 
the Quebec outbreak back into the United States. These in-
stances of backflow (Vermont-07 and Vermont-08; Figure 
1) were each identified within 30 km of the Quebec border, 
again consistent with local transmission of disease.
The 1 case reported in 2015, Quebec-15, was lo-
cated at the western edge of the Quebec border with the 
United States. Contrary to the previous Quebec outbreak, 
the sequence for this case falls into clade III (Figure 1), 
indicating that it is linked to the lineage that has spread 
north through New York, as opposed to the predominantly 
Vermont-associated clade I implicated in the 2006–2009 
outbreak. This finding is not surprising because Quebec-15 
was found in an area directly adjacent to New York (Figure 
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Figure 1. Time-scaled maximum 
clade credibility phylogeny 
of sequenced genomes of 
raccoon-specific variant of 
rabies virus, US–Canada 
border. Branches are colored 
by inferred geographic region. 
Samples belonging to Canada 
lineages are labeled by province 
and year of first sample, as 
is backflow of infection from 
Canada into Vermont. Black 
diamonds indicate nodes with 
>90% posterior support. HPD, 
highest posterior density; NB, 
New Brunswick; ON, Ontario; 
QC, Quebec.
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3) and was reported soon after cases of RRV reached Frank-
lin County, New York, adjacent to the Quebec border. The 
Quebec-15 case was located in an area where vaccination 
had previously not been conducted and has not been fol-
lowed by any further reports of RRV in Quebec. Although 
on first examination the Quebec-15 sequence does exhibit 
some divergence from other sequences in the clade, it is 
again within the 95th percentile of coalescent times for this 
clade (Figure 2, panel B), further confirming that this case 
is probably the result of local spread of viruses from the 
New York side of the Quebec border.
New Brunswick
Our results provide no evidence that either of the outbreaks 
in New Brunswick (2000–2002 and 2014–2015) was initi-
ated by multiple incursions into New Brunswick; however, 
discrete trait phylogeographic analysis gives some limited 
statistical support for backflow of RRV from New Bruns-
wick into Maine (online Technical Appendix Figure 1; note 
that this backflow is not represented in the maximum clade 
credibility tree in Figure 1). Sequences from the second 
New Brunswick outbreak seem closely genetically related 
to sequences circulating in Maine; however, to examine 
further the suggestion of backflow from New Brunswick 
into Maine, and to assess whether the 2000–2002 outbreak 
is the result of local spread or of long-distance translocation 
of infection as was suggested at the time (21), more exten-
sive sampling and sequencing of RRV from cases near the 
New Brunswick border would be necessary. 
Discussion
The use of high-throughput RRV sequencing enabled us to 
investigate events giving rise to a series of transboundary 
RRV outbreaks in eastern provinces of Canada that border 
the United States. By generating high-resolution whole-
genome sequences and comparing results across multiple 
Canada outbreaks, we were able to discriminate between 
different epidemiologic scenarios and gain generalizable 
insights that would not be possible to gain from single-
outbreak data.
In most instances, results were consistent with the 
outbreaks being initiated by 1 lineage, possibly represent-
ing 1 infected individual. A major exception was the out-
break in Quebec in 2006–2009, which involved at least 
4 cross-border incursions. The Quebec 2006–2009 out-
break also showed strong evidence of backflow of infec-
tion from Quebec across the border into the United States. 
The combination of multiple introductions and backflow 
of infection indicates that the Quebec–Vermont border 
and adjacent areas of vaccination were relatively per-
meable to the spread of RRV during 2006–2008. These 
results suggest that this particular outbreak was related 
to systematic challenges in maintaining an effective vac-
cine corridor at this location and time, as opposed to rare 
stochastic events. A likely contributing factor for the 
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Table. Summary of Canada outbreaks and evidence of multiple introductions of raccoon-specific variant of rabies virus, backflow from 







backflow to the United States 
Evidence of long- 
distance movement 
Ontario (east) 1999–2005 132 Yes No No 
Ontario (west) 2015–ongoing 307* No No Yes 
Quebec 2006–2009 104 Yes Yes (strong) No 
Quebec 2015–2015 1 No No No 
New Brunswick 2000–2002 64 No No No 
New Brunswick 2014–ongoing 30* No Yes (weak) No 
*Number correct as of April 30, 2017. 
 
Figure 2. Distribution of coalescent times for raccoon-specific 
variant of rabies virus near the US–Canada border, clade I (A) and 
clade III (B). Gray histograms give the distribution of coalescent 
times for each US sample in the clade, and colored bars and 
labels indicate the coalescent times for the most recent common 
ancestor of each Canada lineage in the specified clade. Gray 
dashed lines indicate the 95th percentiles of the coalescent times 
for virus from the United States. ON, Ontario; QC, Quebec.
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higher transboundary transmission in Quebec is the lack 
of natural barriers along this border, compared with the 
major rivers or lakes that reinforce the border between 
Ontario and the United States. A similar argument can 
be made for the 1999–2005 Ontario outbreak, given the 
evidence for 2 separate introductions into Wolfe Island 
and the mainland, although no indications of backflow 
or further introductions were found. Weak evidence for 
backflow of RRV into the United States was also found 
for New Brunswick, although more in-depth sampling 
from Maine would be necessary to confirm this; other 
outbreaks showed no indication of backflow of infec-
tion into the United States. Transmission of infection in 
both directions across the US–Canada border highlights 
the need for coordination of surveillance programs. For 
future detection of such backflow events, however, sur-
veillance strategies will probably need detailed genomic 
data and dense geographic sampling, as described here for 
New York and Vermont.
Introductions of RRV into Canada were predomi-
nantly attributable to viruses closely genetically related 
to lineages circulating near the US–Canada border. This 
finding indicates that for many outbreaks, whether mul-
tiple introductions or backflow of RRV were evident in 
the data, the largest risk for introduction stems from local 
pressure of infection resulting in RRV spreading through 
the areas of vaccination across the international bound-
ary. This finding is consistent with previous findings of an 
observed breach of the vaccine corridor within the United 
States into the state of Ohio, which also implicated lo-
cal spread of virus lineages through the vaccinated area 
(22). However, we demonstrate that at least 1 introduction 
into Canada (Ontario-15) was attributable to movement 
of infection across an exceptionally large distance. The 
index case was found 64 km from the Ontario–US bor-
der, and our results indicate that it is highly unlikely to 
have originated from US territory within the scale of our 
sampling (75 km from the border). Most raccoon move-
ments are <5 km (23–27); however, long-distance disper-
sal of raccoons covering >100 km has been reported and 
is generally attributed to human-mediated translocation, 
whether deliberate or inadvertent (4,28,29). The Ontar-
io-15 introduction was adjacent to the Niagara region, an 
area where vaccination has been conducted on both sides 
of the border for over a decade and where the border is 
further strengthened by the large Niagara River. It is also 
the area on the US–Canada border that was first reached 
by the northward expansion of RRV in 1994, resulting 
in the longest potential for transboundary incursions. The 
absence of any local spread of infection suggests that the 
local barrier to transboundary incursion of RRV here is 
particularly strong. However, our results highlight that 
such areas are still vulnerable to long-distance transloca-
tion events, effectively allowing RRV infection to bypass 
areas of vaccination completely.
Long-distance translocations are likely to be sto-
chastic events and therefore difficult to predict and pre-
vent; however, on the basis of our evidence, these events 
seem to be relatively rare compared with breaches of the 
vaccination corridor by locally circulating viruses. Al-
though such breaches could occur anywhere along the 
US–Canada border, it is apparent that some areas ex-
perience multiple incursions, either in short succession 
(Ontario, Quebec) or separated by several years (New 
Brunswick), suggesting deterministic factors. Identi-
fication of these factors, which are probably related to 
temporal and spatial variation in raccoon demography or 
vaccination coverage affecting local pressure of infec-
tion, is an area for future work. 
Irrespective of the underlying mechanisms, these re-
sults demonstrate the utility of whole-genome data and 
bioinformatics approaches for resolving transmission 
processes in sensitive areas such as international borders 
for infectious diseases of high public concern. Increased 
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Figure 3. Locations of 
sequenced samples from 
Canada outbreaks of raccoon-
specific variant of rabies virus 
infection in western Ontario 
(n = 1), eastern Ontario (n = 
56), Quebec (n = 51), and New 
Brunswick (n = 32); and from the 
United States within 75 km of 
the border in western New York 
(n = 23), northwestern New York 
(n = 29, including 5 samples into 
clade I, indicated by squares), 
and Vermont (n = 64, including 
2 samples from New York that 
grouped within this clade, 
indicated by squares); and from 
throughout Maine (n = 33). Map generated by using ggmap package (20). NB, New Brunswick; ON, Ontario; QC, Quebec.
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efforts are needed to make these tools available to govern-
ment agencies dealing with transboundary diseases and 
to facilitate international collaboration toward controlling 
and ultimately eliminating the spread of infection.
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Ronnie Henry, Frederick A. Murphy
Negri bodies are cytoplasmic inclusions in neurons that 
are composed of rabies virus pro-
teins and RNA. Adelchi Negri, an 
assistant pathologist working in 
the laboratory of Camillo Golgi, 
observed these inclusions in rab-
bits and dogs with rabies. These 
findings were presented in 1903 at 
a meeting of the Società Medico-
Chirurgica of Pavia. Negri was 
convinced the inclusions were a 
parasitic protozoon and the etio-
logic agent of rabies. Later that 
same year, however, Paul Rem-
linger and Rifat-Bey Frasheri in Constantinople and, separately, Alfonso di Vestea in Naples showed that the 
etiologic agent of rabies is a filterable virus. Negri continued until 1909 to try to prove that the intraneuronal 
neurons named after him corresponded to steps in the developmental cycle of a protozoan. In spite of his incor-
rect etiologic hypothesis, Negri’s discovery represented a breakthrough in the rapid diagnosis of rabies, and the 
detection of Negri bodies was used for many years until the development of modern diagnostic methods.
Left, Adelchi Negri 1876–1912, right: Neuron showing a cytoplasmic inclusion body (Negri 
body, arrow). Courtesy Frederick A. Murphy.
